Answer extracted from the How I Invest with David Weisburd podcast — listen to the full episode below.
The private markets landscape has undergone a radical transformation: the explosion in asset size and the proliferation of firms competing for those assets has made access to terrific funds far more difficult than it was 25 to 30 years ago. Three decades ago, an LP with capital had abundant access to any fund they wanted; today, finding truly exceptional managers is a competitive challenge driven by a fixed pool of capital chasing an exponentially growing number of firms.
In the early phase of modern private equity, liquidity was the LP's advantage. With fewer competing firms and more abundant capital relative to opportunity, institutional investors with checkbooks could secure spots in the best funds almost by default. As John Austin explains in the episode, a limited partner with dry powder three decades ago faced a fundamentally different market dynamic.
Today, the number of private market firms has exploded, while the pool of institutional capital remains relatively fixed. This inversion has flipped the negotiating advantage decisively toward proven managers and away from LPs, regardless of how much capital they hold.
Beyond access, the fundamental competitiveness of the market has shifted what makes money. Investing approaches and sector concentrations that generated outsized returns in the 1990s and early 2000s face a different reality today. As discussed at length in this podcast, what was a great moneymaker decades ago no longer functions the same way—not because the principle was flawed, but because everyone is now deploying capital using similar playbooks.
This compression of returns and opportunities cascades through the entire LP evaluation problem: if a fund manager succeeded wildly with a particular strategy in 2000, that success tells you almost nothing about whether they can replicate it today in a market crowded with competitors executing the same thesis.
"The really truly unforgivable sin is doing things you don't understand. You can't do things you don't understand as a CIO."
John Austin — Founding CIO, Berkeley Endowment. Over 25 years in institutional investing, Austin shaped endowment strategy at one of the world's premier research institutions and brings deep experience from his earlier role as an investor at the Moore Foundation, where he developed rigorous frameworks for evaluating complex fund managers and assessing repeatable investment processes.
Understanding the evolution of market structure matters because it forces LPs to ask harder questions. When you can't simply write a check to access terrific firms anymore, your due diligence process becomes your only edge.
For a deeper dive into how managers' track records actually hold up under scrutiny, and why past performance statistics often mask the real drivers of future results, listen to the full conversation where Austin unpacks the specific elements of investment process that remain durable across market cycles.
A CIO should evaluate how managers source investments, how they evaluate opportunities, how they structure deals, and what value-add they provide post-investment—these operational levers reveal whether a process can repeat across changing market conditions.
LPs should look at the number of investment decisions and transactions, not just the number of years. A hedge fund making hundreds of investments per day generates far more data points than a private equity fund making a few investments per year, revealing whether process works consistently.
Track records are inherently backward looking and can be artifacts of past market conditions, not necessarily predictive of future results. A robust track record requires consistent decision makers, consistent market conditions, and sufficient data points—elements often absent in real fund histories.