Answer extracted from the Coffee & Cap Rates: Commercial Real Estate Podcast — listen to the full episode below.
Vacancy control—the mechanism preventing rent resets when tenants leave an apartment—is the core policy that has destabilized the rent-stabilized market since the 2019 Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act. By capping increases to just 3.47% through Individual Apartment Improvements, the law sits far below the $1,300 average annual operating costs, making it economically unsustainable for landlords and removing an estimated minimum of 50,000 apartments from the housing supply.
Under vacancy control, when a tenant vacates a rent-stabilized apartment, the incoming tenant begins their lease at essentially the same rent as the previous occupant—with only a maximum Individual Apartment Improvement (IAI) increase of 3.47% allowed. This is dramatically different from vacancy bonus systems used in other jurisdictions, which allow landlords to reset rent closer to market rates when units turn over.
As Kenny Burgos explains in this episode of Coffee & Cap Rates, the math is straightforward: operating costs routinely exceed 1,300 dollars annually per unit in rent-stabilized buildings, yet the allowable rent increase caps out at 3.47%. Landlords cannot recover their investment in maintenance, repairs, utilities, or property taxes—let alone generate returns needed for capital improvements or refinancing.
The result has been a flight from the market. Buildings that had any liquidity or financing flexibility have been sold off, converted, or abandoned. Properties that once had market value have plummeted in price—selling for as little as $50,000 per unit in the Bronx, prices not seen since the 1980s.
The policy impact is quantifiable and severe. An estimated minimum of 50,000 rent-stabilized apartments have been removed from the market since the 2019 law took effect. These units are no longer available to tenants—they've been converted, deconverted, or simply held off the market as owners wait for regulatory change or exit opportunities.
When Burgos discusses the state of vacancy control in the full podcast episode, he points to a deeper paradox: a policy designed to protect tenants has actually reduced the supply available to the next generation of renters. Over 80% of the 1 million rent-stabilized units citywide are pre-1974 housing stock—aging buildings that increasingly cannot afford basic maintenance under the current regulatory framework.
"A vacancy reset does not increase rent on any single in-place tenant today, it doesn't cost the city or state government a dollar, and it brings housing supply on the market, softening free market rents."
Kenny Burgos — CEO of NAYA (New York Apartment Association), lifelong New Yorker born and raised in the Bronx with deep family roots in the borough. He majored in economics, initially pursued finance, but caught the political bug after an internship in a city council office. He served as a staffer in city council before being elected to the New York State Assembly at age 26, where he served mostly during the Biden administration and focused extensively on housing policy issues.
The damage extends far beyond individual landlords. Building valuations have fallen by 50% to 60% in rent-stabilized properties since the law's implementation. This erodes the collateral base for refinancing, blocks reinvestment in neighborhoods, and eliminates capital that might otherwise flow into new construction or preservation.
Burgos explores a related phenomenon in the episode: the role of major institutional bankruptcies like Flagstar's $451 million transaction, which dominated rent-stabilized deal flow in early 2026 and signaled the depth of distress in the sector. When the largest transactions in a market are bankruptcy sales, it tells you the market itself is in crisis.
For investors and policymakers alike, the lesson is clear: rental supply constraints are not solved by price controls—they are deepened by them. The 2019 law was intended to protect existing tenants, and it does. But the vacancy control mechanism has inadvertently become the primary driver reducing the total stock available to New Yorkers seeking housing.
Investors should watch interest rates as a top priority, monitor changes in the economy and stock market that could affect property fundamentals, and track emerging regulatory shifts in their respective markets.
Brands are increasingly buying their own permanent retail locations rather than leasing; luxury retailers are purchasing their own storefronts on premium streets like Madison Avenue to secure long-term positioning.
The city needs to produce approximately 60,000 units per year to catch up to the lack of supply, but is currently producing only about half of that volume.